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The risk of ill-informed reform – the future for English flood risk 
management 
 
Abstract 
Flood risk in the UK is recognised by many as a major 21st century challenge. However Flood 
Risk Management (FRM) has become widely contested, with the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (Efra) Committee recently calling for major governance reform. Engaging this debate, 
this commentary evaluates the extent to which such reform is necessary or wise when it appears 
that it may ironically, albeit inadvertently, exacerbate key criticisms of the current system. 
 
Introduction 
Flood Risk Management (FRM) has experienced intense scrutiny following significant winter 
flooding in 2013/14/15/16, marked by media ‘trials’ seeking blame and a barrage of images 
portraying angry flood victims confronting fleeting politician visits. In response, the “Future 
Flood Prevention” report by the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Efra) Committee calls 
for major governance reform (Efra Committee, 2016). But will the proposed changes address 
current concerns, or simply substitute a new set of problems?  
 
Drawing from extensive policy and legal analysis of English FRM and over 60 interviews with 
flood risk professionals within the EU project “STAR-FLOOD” (http://www.starflood.eu/), 
this paper assesses these proposed reforms. Numerous governance design principles were 
identified on the basis of European cross-country comparisons (Alexander et al., 2016a; 
Driessen et al. 2016). However, we focus here on the central principle that only coordinated 
and aligned (sub)-arrangements of flood risk governance, and allied policy domains, can 
deliver holistic and sustainable FRM, whilst maximising the efficient use of resources (Hegger 
et al., 2016). Thus we directly address the Efra Committee’s critique of English flood risk 
governance as being ‘fragmented, inefficient and ineffective’ (p3) and examine their proposed 
remedies.  
 
The evolution of English flood risk governance 
Numerous governance arrangements for FRM have been enacted since the 1930s, increasing 
alignment and integration with land drainage, water management and other environmental 
concerns (Penning-Rowsell and Johnson, 2015). With privatisation in 1989, responsibilities for 
water and FRM were re-divided between water and drainage companies (operating 
commercially, albeit regulated by Ofwat) and the newly created National Rivers Authority 
(thereafter the Environment Agency (EA) in 1996), alongside other Risk Management 
Authorities (RMAs). To address weaknesses in the effectiveness and efficiency of FRM 
attributed to this fragmentation (Pitt, 2008), the Flood and Water Management Act 2010 
assigned strategic responsibility to the EA to oversee FRM for all types of flooding and charged 
Lead Local Flood Authorities (LLFAs) with duties for surface water FRM. Additional clauses 
also required better coordination and collaboration across all RMAs.  
 
Evaluating this current governance arrangement, Alexander et al. (2016a,b) emphasise the 
comprehensiveness of the English system and the coordination achieved through multiple types 
of bridging mechanisms, supporting both efficient and effective FRM. Different policy sectors 
(e.g. spatial planning, civil contingencies and environmental protection) have become more 
aligned and coordinated with the goals of FRM. Moreover, cooperation and collaboration 
amongst RMAs are judged to be effective and supported through numerous strategic 
partnerships (e.g. Local Resilience Fora). This begs the question of whether the drastic reforms 
to governance now proposed are either necessary or desirable.  
 
Proposed reform 
The Efra Committee calls for a new governance model, with a National Floods Commissioner, 
Regional Flood and Coastal Boards and an English Rivers and Coastal Authority to replace the 
functions of the EA, LLFAs and current Regional Flood and Coastal Committees (RFCC) 
(Figure 1). These reforms target the Efra Committee’s desire to i) promote long-term strategic 
planning for FRM; ii) improve transparency and accountability in decision-making; and iii) 
encourage more integrated approaches to flood and water management. They seem to signify 
a partial re-regionalisation of FRM (last seen prior to 1989), whilst also privatising aspects of 
FRM by broadening the remit of the private Water and Drainage companies.  
 
 
Figure 1: Proposed governance reforms for FRM in England 
 
 
In theory, the proposed National Floods Commissioner might strengthen accountability within 
FRM through periodic performance assessments. The Commissioner would also establish ‘a 
rolling 25 year FRM strategy for England, and [….] national funding’ (Efra Committee, 
2016:32) thus building upon existing practices. Indeed, there is already a statutory duty for the 
EA to establish a national Flood and Coastal Erosion Risk Management strategy, with which 
RMAs (except water companies) must act consistently. However, there is some merit in 
aligning this with a strategy for funding, building upon the current 6-year programme (HM 
Treasury, 2014; Defra, 2014) to establish more funding certainty and encourage cost savings 
(ASC, 2014).  
 
However, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) is already in the 
process of merging funding streams and restructuring according to hydrological catchments, to 
inform a 25-year environment plan. The key difference is that the proposed reforms seek to 
isolate responsibilities for flooding from broader environmental concerns and charge an 
independent individual (i.e. a non-Cabinet Minister) to produce this (Efra Committee, 
2016:32). Given the non-political status and maturity of the EA it seems unlikely that 
objectivity is a valid concern, moreover the wealth of relevant expertise within the Agency 
surely makes it best placed for maintaining strategic oversight of FRM.  
 
Regarding the Efra Committee’s proposal to create Regional Flood and Coastal Boards (RFCB) 
it is difficult to see how these would act differently to existing RFCCs. Indeed catchment-based 
decision-making has been fundamental to FRM since 1930. Today, Catchment Flood 
Management Plans and Shoreline Management Plans detail strategic long-term objectives for 
FRM and inform the allocation of resources (EA 2009a, 2009b). A key difference vis-à-vis 
RFCCs, is that RFCBs would take on a greater role in regional FRM planning (coinciding with 
water company boundaries), as well as providing greater support for catchment partnerships. 
However, this RFCB proposal appears more an exercise in re-branding rather than offering 
fundamental change.  
 
The Efra Committee also proposes that existing EA flood functions are siphoned off to a newly 
created English Rivers and Coastal Authority (ERCA) to allow ‘a strong delivery culture to be 
developed for river and coastal defences’ (p33). Here again, we would voice some concern. 
The EA was established on the premise that holistic environmental management is needed to 
deliver the goals of sustainable development. An emphasis only on defence has long gone: 
instead, aligning land (e.g. land use planning, environmental management) and water issues 
(i.e. flood, water resources and water quality) at the catchment scale, has the potential to deliver 
multiple benefits and maximise resource efficiency (Dadson et al., 2017). The Efra Committee 
believes that their proposed reform will better support ‘whole catchment’ approaches, when in 
fact it risks FRM being treated as an isolated policy silo and may actually make integration 
with other catchment-based issues more challenging.   
 
The final suggestion is to extend the roles of water companies and subsume current LLFA 
responsibilities for managing non-main rivers and surface water. There is some logic to 
assigning responsibilities to water companies where drainage expertise is established, 
especially given the ‘deskilling’ that has occurred in local authorities (Pitt, 2008). Whilst local 
authorities have sought to address this gap, this has proved challenging and further exacerbated 
by public expenditure cuts. However if the introduction of integrated Water and Drainage 
Companies is to be the way forward then serious questions need to be asked about the 
appropriateness of transferring these duties to a private industry. This model of FRM 
governance is reliant on regulatory pressure and a careful balance of market principles that is 
currently largely untested.  
 
Furthermore, other RMAs have discussed the challenge today of working alongside this quasi-
commercial mode of governance (see Alexander et al., 2016b). The principal interest in 
commercial gain and customer and shareholder satisfaction was seen to be linked to risk 
avoidance and constraints on willingness (and ability) to invest in alternative, sustainable 
drainage solutions. Moreover, there is no mandatory duty for water companies to act 
consistently with FRM strategies under current legislation. Therefore, it appears that further 
provisions are required to better incentivise water companies to assist the goals of FRM if the 
system is to remain the same as now. Another factor to consider is the integral and legitimate 
role that local authorities play in other aspects of FRM, namely in spatial planning (i.e. reducing 
the build-up of future risk) and emergency management. Given the interconnectivity between 
these issues and strong local grounding, the proposal to strip LLFAs of their responsibilities 
for non-main rivers and surface water management appear unjustified. 
 
Interestingly, despite its critique of fragmented governance, the Efra Committee states that 
current remit of Internal Drainage Boards (IDB) will remain. Moreover, local authorities will 
retain responsibilities for local shoreline management. The report further omits a discussion 
about riparian responsibilities and whether these too should be subsumed by new institutions. 
This is a particularly pertinent issue given that common law responsibilities are poorly 
understood and non-compliance can prove costly (Alexander et al., 2016b). On these matters, 
it is not clear how the reforms will truly resolve the supposed excessive complexity and 
confusion of the existing arrangement.  
 
Moving forward 
This article challenges the Efra’s Committee’s assessment of current flood risk governance as 
being “fragmented, inefficient and ineffective”, on two grounds. Firstly, the current English 
system has considerable strengths (Alexander et al., 2016b; Driessen et al., 2016), suggesting 
that the Efra Committee’s criticisms may be ill-informed and exaggerated.  
 
Secondly, we challenge the extent to which the proposed reforms could actually solve 
perceived or actual issues of fragmentation, inefficiency and ineffectiveness. In particular, the 
Efra Committee appears to prioritise the goals of integrated water management above the 
integration of FRM with the environment. Here, the proposed reforms risk positioning 
flood/water management in a policy silo and in turn threaten the current coordination between 
allied policy domains, essential for delivering whole catchment-based approaches. Moreover, 
the Efra Committee’s plan to remove certain responsibilities from local authorities fails to 
acknowledge the legitimate role they currently play in multiple aspects of FRM and the 
drawbacks of fragmenting these.  
 
In this light, the Efra Committee’s plans to better integrate flood and water management 
threaten to create fragmentation in other aspects of FRM, potentially creating new 
inefficiencies and governance ineffectiveness. Therefore, whilst we recognise that there is 
scope for improvement in FRM we challenge the necessity of major reform and argue that these 
may inadvertently exacerbate, rather than alleviate, key criticisms of the current system. 
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